

A General Family of Preferential Belief Removal Operators

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Abstract

Most belief change operators in the AGM tradition assume an underlying plausibility ordering over the possible worlds which is transitive and complete. A unifying structure for these operators, based on supplementing the plausibility ordering with a second, guiding, relation over the worlds was presented in [7]. However it is not always reasonable to assume completeness of the underlying ordering. In this paper we generalise the structure of [7] to allow incomparabilities between worlds. We axiomatise the resulting class of belief removal functions, and show that it includes an important family of removal functions based on finite prioritised belief bases.

1 Introduction

The problem of *belief removal* [1, 7, 24], i.e., the problem of what an agent, hereafter \mathcal{A} , should believe after being directed to remove some sentence from his stock of beliefs, has been well studied in philosophy and in AI over the last 25 years. During that time many different families of removal functions have been studied. A great many of them are based on constructions employing *total preorders* over the set of possible worlds which is meant to stand for some notion \leq of relative *plausibility* [14]. A unifying construction for these families was given in [7], in which a general construction was proposed which involved supplementing the relation \leq with a second, guiding, relation \preceq which formed a subset of \leq . By varying the conditions on \preceq and its interaction with \leq many of the different families can be captured as instances.

The construction in [7] achieves a high level of generality, but one can argue it fails to be general enough in one important respect: the underlying plausibility order \leq is *always* assumed to be a total preorder which by definition implies it is *complete*, i.e., for any two worlds x, y , we have either $x \leq y$ or $y \leq x$. This implies that agent \mathcal{A} is *always* able to decide which of x, y is more plausible. This is not always realistic, as

already argued by Katsuno and Mendelzon [14] who show that a number of intuitively appealing constructions for *belief revision* do not make use of total preorders. Given the strong link between belief removal and belief revision, the same argument applies to belief removal as well. It therefore seems desirable to study belief removal based on plausibility orderings which allow *incomparabilities*. Some work has been done on this ([5, 11, 2, 14, 22], and especially the choice-theoretic approach to belief change advocated in [23]) but not much. This is in contrast to work in nonmonotonic reasoning (NMR), the research area which is so often referred to as the “other side of the coin” to belief change. In NMR, semantic models based on incomplete orderings are the norm, with work dating back to the seminal papers on *preferential models* of [15, 25]. Our aim in this paper is to relax the completeness assumption from [7] and to investigate the resulting, even more general class of removal functions.

The plan of this paper is as follows. In Section 2 we give our generalised definition of the construction from [7], which we call (*semi-modular*) *contexts*. We describe their associated removal functions, as well as mention the characterisation from [7]. Then in Section 3 we present an axiomatic characterisation of the family of removal functions generated by semi-modular contexts. Then, in Section 4 we mention a couple of further restrictions on contexts, leading to two corresponding extra postulates. In Section 5 we mention an important subfamily of the general family, i.e., those removals which may be generated by a finite prioritised base of *defaults*, before moving on to AGM style removal in Section 6. We conclude in Section 7.

1.1 Preliminaries

We work in a finitely-generated propositional language L . The set of non-tautologous sentences in L is denoted by L_* . The set of propositional worlds/models is W . For any set of sentences $X \subseteq L$, the set of worlds which satisfy every sentence in X is denoted by $[X]$. Classical logical consequence and equivalence are denoted by \vdash and \equiv respectively. As above, we let \mathcal{A} denote some agent whose beliefs are subject to change. A *belief set* for \mathcal{A} is represented by a single sentence which is meant to stand for all its logical consequences. Given that we work in a finitely generated setting, this is a reasonable representation, and one that is frequently adopted.¹ A *belief removal function* (hereafter just *removal function*) belonging to \mathcal{A} is a unary function $*$ which takes any non-tautologous sentence $\lambda \in L_*$ as input and returns a new belief set $*(\lambda)$ for \mathcal{A} such that $*(\lambda) \not\vdash \lambda$. For any removal function $*$ we can always derive an associated belief set. It is just the belief set obtained by removing the contradiction, i.e., $*(\perp)$.

The following definitions about orderings will be useful in what follows. A binary relation R over W is:

- *reflexive* iff $\forall x : xRx$
- *transitive* iff $\forall x, y, z : xRy \ \& \ yRz \rightarrow xRz$
- *complete* iff $\forall x, y : xRy \vee yRx$
- a *preorder* iff it is reflexive and transitive

¹E.g., this is the representation used by Katsuno and Mendelzon [14].

- a *total preorder* iff it is a complete preorder

The above notions are used generally when talking of “weak” orderings, where xRy is meant to stand for something like “ x is *at least as good as* y ”. However in this paper, following the lead of [22], we will find it more natural to work under a *strict* reading, where xRy denotes “ x is *strictly better than* y ”. In this setting, the following notions will naturally arise. R is:

- *irreflexive* iff $\forall x : \text{not}(xRx)$
- *modular* iff $\forall x, y, z : xRy \rightarrow (xRz \vee zRy)$
- a *strict partial order (spo)* iff it is both irreflexive and transitive
- the *strict part of* another relation R' iff $\forall x, y : xRy \leftrightarrow (xR'y \ \& \ \text{not}(yR'x))$
- the *converse complement* of R' iff $\forall x, y : xRy \leftrightarrow \text{not}(yR'x)$

We have that R is a modular spo iff it is the strict part of a total preorder [18]. So in terms of *strict* relations, much of the previous work on belief removal, including [7], assumes an underlying strict order which is a modular spo. It is precisely the modularity condition which we want to relax in this paper.

Given any ordering R and $x \in W$, let $\nabla_R(x) = \{z \in W \mid zRx\}$ be the set of all worlds below x in R . Then we may define a new binary relation \sqsubseteq^R from R by setting $x \sqsubseteq^R y$ iff $\nabla_R(x) \subseteq \nabla_R(y)$. That is, $x \sqsubseteq^R y$ iff every element below x in R is also below y in R . It is easy to check that if R is a modular spo then $x \sqsubseteq^R y$ iff $\text{not}(yRx)$, i.e., \sqsubseteq^R is just the converse complement of R .

2 Contexts, modular contexts and removals

In this section we set up our generalised definition of a context, show how each such context yields a removal function and vice versa, and recap the main results from [7].

2.1 Contexts

We assume our agent \mathcal{A} has in his mind *two* binary relations ($<$, \prec) over the set W . The relation $<$ is a *strict* plausibility relation which forms the basis for \mathcal{A} 's actionable beliefs, i.e., $x < y$ means that, to \mathcal{A} 's mind, and on the basis of all available evidence, *world x is strictly more plausible than y* . We assume $<$ is a strict partial order. In addition to this there is a second binary relation \prec . This relation is open to several different interpretations, but the one we attach is as follows: $x \prec y$ means “ \mathcal{A} has **an explicit reason** to hold x more plausible than y (or to treat x more favourably than y)”. We will use \preceq to denote the converse complement of \prec , i.e., $x \preceq y$ iff $y \not\prec x$. Thus $x \preceq y$ iff \mathcal{A} has no reason to treat y more favourably than x . Note \preceq and \prec are interdefinable, and we find it convenient to switch between them freely.

Note the equivalence “ $x \prec y$ iff both $x \preceq y$ and $y \not\preceq x$ ” holds only if \prec is asymmetric, which might not hold in general, since it is perfectly possible for \mathcal{A} to have one explicit reason to hold x more plausible than y , and another to hold y more plausible than x . In

this case both these reasons will compete with each other, with at most one of the pairs $\langle x, y \rangle$ or $\langle y, x \rangle$ making it into \mathcal{A} 's plausibility relation $<$.

What are the properties of \prec ? We assume only two things, at least to begin with: (i) an agent can never possess a reason to hold a world strictly more plausible than itself, and (ii) an agent does not hold a world x to be more plausible than another world y , i.e., $x < y$, *without* being in possession of some reason for doing so. (Note this latter property lends a certain “foundationalist” flavour to our construction.) All this is formalised in the following definition:

Definition 2.1 *A context \mathcal{C} is a pair of binary relations $(<, \prec)$ over W such that:*

(C1) $<$ is a strict partial order

(C2) \prec is irreflexive

(C3) $< \subseteq \prec$

If $<$ is modular then we call \mathcal{C} a *modular context*. We will later have grounds for strengthening (C3).

How does \mathcal{A} use his context \mathcal{C} to construct a removal function $\ast_{\mathcal{C}}$? In terms of models, the set $[\ast_{\mathcal{C}}(\lambda)]$ of models of his new belief set, when removing a sentence λ , *must* include some $\neg\lambda$ -worlds. Following the usual practice in belief revision, he should take the most plausible ones according to $<$, i.e., the $<$ -minimal ones. But which, if any, of the λ -worlds should be included? The following principle was proposed by Rott and Pagnucco [24]:

Principle of Weak Preference

If one object is held in equal or higher regard than another, the former should be treated no worse than the latter.

Rott and Pagnucco use this principle to argue that the new set of worlds following removal should contain all worlds x which are not less plausible than a $<$ -minimal $\neg\lambda$ -world y , i.e., $y \not< x$. We propose to apply a tempered version of this principle using the second ordering \prec . We include x if there is *no explicit reason to believe* that y is more plausible than x , i.e., if $y \not\prec x$.

Definition 2.2 (\ast from \mathcal{C}) *Given a context \mathcal{C} we define the removal function $\ast_{\mathcal{C}}$ by setting, for each $\lambda \in L_*$, $[\ast_{\mathcal{C}}(\lambda)] = \bigcup \{\nabla_{\prec}(y) \mid y \in \min_{<}([\neg\lambda])\}$.*

It can be shown that different contexts give rise to different removal functions, i.e., the mapping $\mathcal{C} \mapsto \ast_{\mathcal{C}}$ is injective. The case of modular contexts was the one which was studied in detail in [7], where it was shown how, by placing various restrictions on the interaction between $<$ and \prec , this family captures a wide range of removal operations which have been previously studied, for example both AGM contraction *and* AGM revision [1]², severe withdrawal [24], systematic withdrawal [19] and belief liberation [6]. For the general family in that paper the following representation result was proved.

Theorem 2.3 ([7, 8]) *Let \mathcal{C} be a modular context. Then $\ast_{\mathcal{C}}$ satisfies the following rules:*

(\ast 1) $\ast(\lambda) \not\prec \lambda$

²The fact that basic removal also covers AGM revision is what motivated our choice of the contraction-revision “hybrid” symbol \ast to denote removal functions.

- (***2**) If $\lambda_1 \equiv \lambda_2$ then $\ast(\lambda_1) \equiv \ast(\lambda_2)$
- (***3**) If $\ast(\lambda \wedge \chi) \vdash \chi$ then $\ast(\lambda \wedge \chi \wedge \psi) \vdash \chi$
- (***4**) If $\ast(\lambda \wedge \chi) \vdash \chi$ then $\ast(\lambda \wedge \chi) \vdash \ast(\lambda)$
- (***5**) $\ast(\lambda \wedge \chi) \vdash \ast(\lambda) \vee \ast(\chi)$
- (***6**) If $\ast(\lambda \wedge \chi) \not\vdash \lambda$ then $\ast(\lambda) \vdash \ast(\lambda \wedge \chi)$

Furthermore if \ast is any removal function satisfying the above six rules, there exists a unique modular context \mathcal{C} such that $\ast = \ast_{\mathcal{C}}$.

All these rules are familiar from the belief removal literature. (***1**) is the Success postulate which says the sentence to be removed is no longer implied by the new belief set, while (***2**) is a syntax-irrelevance property. (***3**) is sometimes known as Conjunctive Trisection [13, 22]. A slight reformulation of it can be found already in [1] under the name Partial Antitony. It says if χ is believed after removing the conjunction $\lambda \wedge \chi$, then it should also be believed when removing the longer conjunction $\lambda \wedge \chi \wedge \psi$. Rule (***4**) is closely-related to the rule Cut from the area of non-monotonic reasoning [15], while (***5**) and (***6**) are the two AGM supplementary postulates for contraction [1]. Note we can give (***3**) an equivalent formulation:

Proposition 2.4 *In the presence of (***2**), rule (***3**) is equivalent to*

$$(\mathbf{*3}') \quad \neg\chi \wedge \ast(\lambda \wedge \chi) \vdash \ast(\chi)$$

Proof. To show (***3**) and (***2**) imply (***3'**), first, we know $\ast(\chi) \vdash (\neg\chi \rightarrow \ast(\chi))$. Since $\chi \equiv (\neg\chi \rightarrow \ast(\chi)) \wedge \chi$ this means $\ast(\chi) \equiv \ast((\neg\chi \rightarrow \ast(\chi)) \wedge \chi)$ by (***2**) and so we obtain $\ast((\neg\chi \rightarrow \ast(\chi)) \wedge \chi) \vdash (\neg\chi \rightarrow \ast(\chi))$. Applying (***3**) to this we may deduce $\ast((\neg\chi \rightarrow \ast(\chi)) \wedge \chi \wedge \lambda) \vdash (\neg\chi \rightarrow \ast(\chi))$. But $(\neg\chi \rightarrow \ast(\chi)) \wedge \chi \wedge \lambda \equiv \lambda \wedge \chi$. Hence by (***2**) we get $\ast(\lambda \wedge \chi) \vdash (\neg\chi \rightarrow \ast(\chi))$, equivalently $\neg\chi \wedge \ast(\lambda \wedge \chi) \vdash \ast(\chi)$ as required. To show (***3'**) and (***2**) imply (***3**), suppose $\ast(\lambda \wedge \chi) \vdash \chi$. Now, (***3'**) (with a little help from (***2**)) tells us $\neg(\lambda \wedge \chi) \wedge \ast(\lambda \wedge \chi \wedge \psi) \vdash \ast(\lambda \wedge \chi)$. Hence using this with the assumption $\ast(\lambda \wedge \chi) \vdash \chi$ yields $\neg(\lambda \wedge \chi) \wedge \ast(\lambda \wedge \chi \wedge \psi) \vdash \chi$. By classical logic this is equivalent to the desired $\ast(\lambda \wedge \chi \wedge \psi) \vdash \chi$. \square

As a special case of (***3'**) (putting $\lambda = \perp$) we get $\neg\chi \wedge \ast(\perp) \vdash \ast(\chi)$, i.e., the set of sentences believed after removing χ is a subset of the set of sentences believed after *expanding* (i.e., conjoining) the initial belief set with $\neg\chi$. In [7] this latter rule was included as an axiom in the list of rules characterising modular removal. Proposition 2.4 shows that this rule is redundant in the list.

Given the prominence of AGM contraction in the literature [1], it is worth noting that this list does not include the AGM contraction postulates Vacuity ($\ast(\perp) \not\vdash \lambda$ implies $\ast(\lambda) \equiv \ast(\perp)$), Inclusion ($\ast(\perp) \vdash \ast(\lambda)$) and Recovery ($\ast(\lambda) \wedge \lambda \vdash \ast(\perp)$), none of which are valid in general for removal functions generated from modular contexts. Vacuity has been argued against as a general principle of belief removal in [7, 8]. Inclusion has been questioned in [6], while Recovery has long been regarded as controversial (see, e.g., [12]). Nevertheless we will see in Section 6 how each of these three rules may be captured within our general framework.

The second part of Theorem 2.3 was proved using the following construction.

Definition 2.5 (*C from **) Given any removal function $*$ we define the context $\mathcal{C}(*) = (<, \prec)$ as follows: $x < y$ iff $y \notin [* (\neg x \wedge \neg y)]$ (equivalently, $*(\neg x \wedge \neg y) \vdash \neg y$) and $x \prec y$ iff $y \notin [* (\neg x)]$ (equivalently, $*(\neg x) \vdash \neg y$).³

[7] showed that if $*$ satisfies $(*1)$ - $(*6)$ then $\mathcal{C}(*)$ is a modular context and $* = *_{\mathcal{C}(*)}$.

3 Characterising the general family

Now we want to drop the assumption that $<$ is modular and assume only it is a strict partial order. How can we characterise the resulting class of removal functions? This the question we pose in this section, and we provide an answer at the end of the section. To start with, we focus first on establishing which of the postulates from Theorem 2.3 are sound for the general family, modifying our initial construction as and when necessary. Clearly we cannot expect that all the rules remain sound. In particular rule $(*6)$ is known to depend on the modularity of $<$ and so might be expected to be the first to go. However we might hope to retain weaker versions of it, for instance:

(*6a) If $*(\lambda \wedge \chi) \vdash \chi$ then $*(\lambda) \vdash *(\lambda \wedge \chi)$

(*6b) $*(\lambda) \wedge *(\chi) \vdash *(\lambda \wedge \chi)$

These two rules appear respectively as (-8c) and (-8r) in [23] (see also [2]). **(*6b)** follows from **(*6)** given **(*1)**.

Proposition 3.1 *If \mathcal{C} is a general context then $*_{\mathcal{C}}$ satisfies $(*1)$, $(*2)$, $(*4)$, $(*5)$ and $(*6a)$.*

Proof. **(*1)** holds because $[*_{\mathcal{C}}(\lambda)]$ picks up at least one $\neg\lambda$ -world. **(*2)** holds because the result depends only on $[\neg\lambda]$.

To show **(*4)** suppose $*_{\mathcal{C}}(\lambda \wedge \chi) \vdash \chi$. Suppose $x \in [*_{\mathcal{C}}(\lambda \wedge \chi)]$. We must show $x \in [*_{\mathcal{C}}(\lambda)]$. But if $x \in [*_{\mathcal{C}}(\lambda \wedge \chi)]$ then $x \preceq y$ for some $y \in \min_{<}([\neg(\lambda \wedge \chi)])$. It suffices to show $y \in \min_{<}([\neg\lambda])$. First we need to show $y \in [\neg\lambda]$. Since $\min_{<}([\neg(\lambda \wedge \chi)]) \subseteq [*_{\mathcal{C}}(\lambda \wedge \chi)]$ by reflexivity of \preceq we know $y \in [*_{\mathcal{C}}(\lambda \wedge \chi)]$ and so, from the assumption $*_{\mathcal{C}}(\lambda \wedge \chi) \vdash \chi$, $y \in [\chi]$. Now since $y \in \min_{<}([\neg(\lambda \wedge \chi)])$ we also know $y \in [\neg(\lambda \wedge \chi)]$ and so from this and $y \in [\chi]$ we may deduce $y \in [\neg\lambda]$ as required. Now if it were the case that $y \notin \min_{<}([\neg\lambda])$ then we would have $z < y$ for some $z \in [\neg\lambda]$. But since in this case also $z \in [\neg(\lambda \wedge \chi)]$, this would contradict $y \in \min_{<}([\neg(\lambda \wedge \chi)])$. Hence $y \in \min_{<}([\neg\lambda])$ as required.

(*5) holds because of the property $\min_{<}([\neg\lambda \vee \neg\chi]) \subseteq (\min_{<}([\neg\lambda]) \cup \min_{<}([\neg\chi]))$ (which, incidentally, as with the proof of **(*4)**, doesn't depend on any property of $<$).

For **(*6a)** suppose $*_{\mathcal{C}}(\lambda \wedge \chi) \vdash \chi$ and let $x \in [*_{\mathcal{C}}(\lambda)]$. We must show $x \in [*_{\mathcal{C}}(\lambda \wedge \chi)]$. Since $x \in [*_{\mathcal{C}}(\lambda)]$ there exists $y \in \min_{<}([\neg\lambda])$ such that $x \preceq y$. If we can show $y \in \min_{<}([\neg(\lambda \wedge \chi)])$ then we are done. So suppose for contradiction $y \notin \min_{<}([\neg(\lambda \wedge \chi)])$. Then there exists $z \in [\neg(\lambda \wedge \chi)]$ such that $z < y$. By transitivity of $<$ we may assume $z \in \min_{<}([\neg(\lambda \wedge \chi)])$. Then using the assumption $*_{\mathcal{C}}(\lambda \wedge \chi) \vdash \chi$ we deduce $z \in [\chi]$, which

³When a world appears in the scope of a propositional connective, it should be understood as denoting any sentence which has that world as its only model.

together with the fact $z \in [\neg(\lambda \wedge \chi)]$ implies $z \in [\neg\lambda]$. But $z \in [\neg\lambda]$ and $z < y$ contradicts $y \in \min_{<}([\neg\lambda])$. Hence $y \in \min_{<}([\neg(\lambda \wedge \chi)])$ as required. \square

(***6b**) (and hence (***6**)) does not hold (if L contains more than two propositional variables), as the following counterexample shows:

Example 3.2 Suppose $L = p, q, r$. We assume each of the eight valuations of L may be represented as a sequence abc where each of a, b and c is an element of $\{0, 1\}$ denoting the truth-value of p, q, r respectively. Let $< = \{(101, 010), (011, 100)\}$ and let $\preceq = < \cup \{(111, 010), (111, 100)\}$. Then $010 \in \min_{<}([\neg p])$ so $111 \in [*_{\mathcal{C}}(p)]$. Also $100 \in \min_{<}([\neg q])$ so $111 \in [*_{\mathcal{C}}(q)]$. Hence $111 \in [*_{\mathcal{C}}(p) \wedge *_{\mathcal{C}}(q)]$. If (***6b**) holds then we would conclude $111 \in [*_{\mathcal{C}}(p \wedge q)]$. But since 010 and 100 are the only two elements x such that $111 \preceq x$ this would imply either $010 \in \min_{<}([\neg(p \wedge q)])$ or $100 \in \min_{<}([\neg(p \wedge q)])$. But 010 and 100 are $<$ -dominated in $[\neg(p \wedge q)]$ by 101 and 011 respectively. Hence $111 \notin [*_{\mathcal{C}}(p \wedge q)]$ and so (***6b**) cannot hold.

Given the more general scenario in which we now find ourselves, we also lose (***3**), as the following counterexample shows:

Example 3.3 Assume $L = \{p, q\}$ and let the four valuations of L be $W = \{00, 11, 01, 10\}$, where the first and second numbers denote the truth-values of p, q respectively. Let $< = \{(00, 10)\}$ and let $\preceq = < \cup \{(10, 01)\}$ (strictly speaking the reflexive closure of this). We have $*_{\mathcal{C}}(p \wedge q) = \{00, 10, 01\}$ and $*_{\mathcal{C}}(q) = \{00\}$. Hence $10 \in [\neg q \wedge *_{\mathcal{C}}(p \wedge q)]$ but $10 \notin [*_{\mathcal{C}}(q)]$.

This leaves us with a problem, since whereas (***6**) is to be considered somewhat dispensible, (***3**) is a very reasonable property for removal functions. Is there some way we can capture it? It turns out we can capture it if we strengthen the basic property (**C3**) to:

$$(\mathbf{C3a}) \quad \preceq \subseteq \sqsubseteq \subseteq^{<}^4$$

In other words if $z < x$ and $x \preceq y$ then $z < y$. (**C3a**) is a *coherence* condition between \prec and $<$. It is saying that if there is a world z which \mathcal{A} judges to be more plausible than x but not to y then \mathcal{A} has a reason to treat y more favourably than x . Note that for modular contexts (**C3**) and (**C3a**) are equivalent, but in general they are not.

Proposition 3.4 If \mathcal{C} satisfies (**C3a**) then $*_{\mathcal{C}}$ satisfies (***3**).

Proof. To see this suppose $*_{\mathcal{C}}(\lambda \wedge \chi) \vdash \chi$ and let $x \in [*_{\mathcal{C}}(\lambda \wedge \chi \wedge \psi)]$. We must show $x \in [\chi]$. If $x \in [\lambda \wedge \chi]$ then clearly we are done, so suppose $x \in [\neg(\lambda \wedge \chi)]$. We will show $x \in \min_{<}([\neg(\lambda \wedge \chi)])$, from which we can then deduce $x \in [\chi]$ from $*_{\mathcal{C}}(\lambda \wedge \chi) \vdash \chi$. Suppose for contradiction $x \notin \min_{<}([\neg(\lambda \wedge \chi)])$. Then there exists $z \in [\neg(\lambda \wedge \chi)]$ such that $z < x$. Now since $x \in [*_{\mathcal{C}}(\lambda \wedge \chi \wedge \psi)]$ there exists $y \in \min_{<}([\neg(\lambda \wedge \chi \wedge \psi)])$ such that $x \preceq y$. From (**C3a**) this gives $z < y$, but this contradicts the minimality of y , giving the required contradiction. \square

Thus (**C3a**) seems necessary. And in fact without it we don't get the following important technical result, which provides the means to describe $<$ -minimal λ -worlds purely in terms of the removal function:

⁴Recall from Section 1.1 that $\sqsubseteq^{<}$ is defined as: $x \sqsubseteq^{<} y$ iff $\nabla_{<}(x) \subseteq \nabla_{<}(y)$.

Proposition 3.5 Let $\mathcal{C} = (<, \prec)$ be any context which satisfies (C3a). Then for all λ such that $\neg\lambda \in L_*$ we have $[\ast_{\mathcal{C}}(\neg\lambda) \wedge \lambda] = \min_{<}([\lambda])$.

Proof. The right-to-left inclusion follows from the reflexivity of \preceq . For the left-to-right inclusion suppose $x \in [\ast_{\mathcal{C}}(\neg\lambda) \wedge \lambda]$. Then $x \in [\lambda]$ and $x \preceq y$ for some $y \in \min_{<}([\lambda])$. If there were some $z \in [\lambda]$ such that $z < x$ then we would have $z < y$ from (C3a) - contradiction. Hence $x \in \min_{<}([\lambda])$ as required. \square

Example 3.3 provides a counterexample showing this might not be possible in general, for there we have $[\ast_{\mathcal{C}}(p \wedge q) \wedge \neg(p \wedge q)] = \{00, 10, 01\}$ but $\min_{<}([\neg(p \wedge q)]) = \{00, 01\}$. Note that rule (C3a) may also be interpreted as a restricted form of modularity for $<$, since it may be re-written as $\forall x, y, z (z < x \rightarrow (y \prec x \vee z < y))$. For this reason we consider the following definition:

Definition 3.6 A semi-modular context is any context \mathcal{C} satisfying (C3a).

In the rest of the paper we will work only with semi-modular contexts. Example 3.2 shows that $\ast_{\mathcal{C}}$ still fails in general to satisfy (*6b) even for semi-modular contexts.

So far we have a list of sound properties for the removal functions defined from semi-modular contexts. They are the same as the rules which characterise modular removal, but with (*6) replaced by the weaker (*6a). It might be hoped that this list is complete, i.e., that any removal function \ast satisfying these 6 rules is equal to $\ast_{\mathcal{C}}$ for some semi-modular context \mathcal{C} . Indeed we might expect to be able to show $\ast = \ast_{\mathcal{C}(\ast)}$, where $\mathcal{C}(\ast)$ is the context defined via Definition 2.5. The following result gives us a good start.

Proposition 3.7 Let \ast be any removal function satisfying (*1)-(*5) and (*6a). Then $\mathcal{C}(\ast)$ is a context, i.e., satisfies (C1)-(C3).

Proof. (Outline) $<$ is a strict partial order from (*1), (*2), (*3) and (*6a). \prec is irreflexive from (*1), and (C3) is satisfied via the following consequence of (*6a):

(*6c) If $\ast(\lambda \wedge \chi) \vdash \chi$ then $\ast(\lambda) \vdash \chi$

Note the antecedent of this rule corresponds to the usual reading of “ χ is strictly more entrenched than λ ”. Thus a possible reading of (*6c) is “ χ can never be excluded by removing a strictly less entrenched sentence”. \square

However to get (C3a) it seems an extra property is needed:

(*C) If $\ast(\lambda) \wedge \neg\lambda \vdash \ast(\chi) \wedge \neg\chi$ then $\ast(\lambda) \vdash \ast(\chi)$

We can rephrase this using the *Levi Identity* [17]. Given any removal function \ast we may define a *revision function* \ast^R by setting, for each consistent sentence $\lambda \in L$, $\ast^R(\lambda) = \ast(\neg\lambda) \wedge \lambda$. Then rule (*C) may be equivalently written as:

(*C') If $\ast^R(\neg\lambda) \vdash \ast^R(\neg\chi)$ then $\ast(\lambda) \vdash \ast(\chi)$

Thus (*C') is effectively saying that if revising by $\neg\lambda$ leads to a stronger belief set than revising by $\neg\chi$, then removing λ leads to a stronger belief set than removing χ . The next result confirms that this rule is sound for the removal functions generated by semi-modular contexts, and that this property is enough to show that $\mathcal{C}(\ast)$ satisfies (C3a).

Proposition 3.8 *Let \mathcal{C} be a semi-modular context. Then \ast_c satisfies $(\ast\mathbf{C})$. Furthermore if \ast is any removal function satisfying $(\ast\mathbf{C})$, $(\ast\mathbf{1})$, $(\ast\mathbf{3})$ and $(\ast\mathbf{6a})$ then the context $\mathcal{C}(\ast)$ satisfies $(\mathbf{C3a})$.*

Proof. To show \ast_c satisfies $(\ast\mathbf{C})$, suppose $\ast_c(\lambda) \wedge \neg\lambda \vdash \ast_c(\chi) \wedge \neg\chi$. Then by Proposition 3.5 $\min_{<}([\neg\lambda]) \subseteq \min_{<}([\neg\chi])$. So if $x \preceq y$ for some $y \in \min_{<}([\neg\lambda])$ then $x \preceq y$ for some $y \in \min_{<}([\neg\chi])$. Hence $[\ast_c(\lambda)] \subseteq [\ast_c(\chi)]$ as required.

Now let \ast be a removal function satisfying $(\ast\mathbf{C})$. We will show that if $z < x$ and $z \not\prec y$ then $y \prec x$. So suppose $z < x$ and $z \not\prec y$, i.e., $x \notin [\ast(\neg z \wedge \neg x)]$ and $y \in [\ast(\neg z \wedge \neg y)]$. We must show $x \notin [\ast(\neg y)]$. We know by $(\ast\mathbf{1})$ that $y \in [\ast(\neg y)]$. Using this together with $y \in [\ast(\neg z \wedge \neg y)]$ allows us to deduce $\ast(\neg y) \wedge y \vdash \ast(\neg z \wedge \neg y) \wedge \neg(\neg z \wedge \neg y)$ and so, using $(\ast\mathbf{C})$, we get $\ast(\neg y) \vdash \ast(\neg z \wedge \neg y)$. Hence if we can show $\ast(\neg z \wedge \neg y) \vdash \neg x$ then our desired conclusion $x \notin [\ast(\neg y)]$ will follow. But from the assumption $x \notin [\ast(\neg z \wedge \neg x)]$ we know $\ast(\neg z \wedge \neg x) \vdash \neg x$ and so from this and $(\ast\mathbf{3})$ we have $\ast(\neg z \wedge \neg x \wedge \neg y) \vdash \neg x$. From this and $(\ast\mathbf{6a})$ we get $\ast(\neg z \wedge \neg y) \vdash \ast(\neg z \wedge \neg x \wedge \neg y)$ and so the transitivity of \vdash gives the required $\ast(\neg z \wedge \neg y) \vdash \neg x$. \square

Rule $(\ast\mathbf{C})$ is actually quite strong. In the presence of $(\ast\mathbf{3})$ it can be shown to imply $(\ast\mathbf{4})$. This means that, in the axiomatisation of \ast_c we can replace $(\ast\mathbf{4})$ with $(\ast\mathbf{C})$. To show that the list of rules is complete, it remains to prove $\ast = \ast_{\mathcal{C}(\ast)}$. It turns out that here we need the following weakening of $(\ast\mathbf{6b})$:

$$(\ast\mathbf{E}) \quad \neg(\lambda \wedge \chi) \wedge \ast(\lambda) \wedge \ast(\chi) \vdash \ast(\lambda \wedge \chi)$$

This rule may be reformulated as “ $\ast(\lambda) \wedge \ast(\chi) \vdash (\lambda \wedge \chi) \vee \ast(\lambda \wedge \chi)$ ”. In this reformulation, the right hand side of the turnstile may be thought of as standing for all those consequences of the conjunction $\lambda \wedge \chi$ which are *believed* upon its removal. The rule is saying that any such surviving consequence must be derivable from the *combination* of $\ast(\lambda)$ and $\ast(\chi)$.

Proposition 3.9 *Let \mathcal{C} be a semi-modular context. Then \ast_c satisfies $(\ast\mathbf{E})$.*

Proof. Suppose $x \in [\neg(\lambda \wedge \chi) \wedge \ast_c(\lambda) \wedge \ast_c(\chi)]$. We must show $x \in [\ast_c(\lambda \wedge \chi)]$. Since $x \in [\ast_c(\lambda)]$ we know $x \preceq y_1$ for some $y_1 \in \min_{<}([\neg\lambda])$. Similarly since $x \in [\ast_c(\chi)]$ we know $x \preceq y_2$ for some $y_2 \in \min_{<}([\neg\chi])$. We will show the existence of y_1, y_2 implies $x \in \min_{<}([\neg(\lambda \wedge \chi)])$, which will be enough to show $x \in [\ast_c(\lambda \wedge \chi)]$ by Proposition 3.5. Suppose for contradiction $x \notin \min_{<}([\neg(\lambda \wedge \chi)])$. Then there exists $z < x$ such that $z \in [\neg(\lambda \wedge \chi)]$. Clearly either $z \in [\neg\lambda]$ or $z \in [\neg\chi]$. In the former case we get $z < x \preceq y_1$ and so $z < y_1$ by $(\mathbf{C3})$ - contradicting the minimality of y_1 . Similarly in the latter case we obtain $z < y_2$, contradicting the minimality of y_2 . Hence $x \in \min_{<}([\neg(\lambda \wedge \chi)])$ as required. \square

Lemma 3.10 *Any removal function \ast satisfying $(\ast\mathbf{2})$ and $(\ast\mathbf{E})$ also satisfies the following rule.*

$$(\ast\mathbf{E}') \quad \text{If } \neg\psi \vdash \ast(\lambda \wedge \psi) \wedge \ast(\chi \wedge \psi) \text{ then } \neg\psi \vdash \ast(\lambda \wedge \chi \wedge \psi).$$

Proof. By **(∗E)** we know $\neg(\lambda \wedge \chi \wedge \psi) \wedge \ast(\lambda \wedge \psi) \wedge \ast(\chi \wedge \psi) \vdash \ast(\lambda \wedge \chi \wedge \psi)$. Since $\neg\psi \vdash \neg(\lambda \wedge \chi \wedge \psi)$ and $\neg\psi \vdash \ast(\lambda \wedge \psi) \wedge \ast(\chi \wedge \psi)$ by assumption, this gives the required conclusion. \square

Theorem 3.11 *Let \ast be any removal function satisfying **(∗1)**, **(∗2)**, **(∗3)**, **(∗C)**, **(∗5)**, **(∗6a)** and **(∗E)**. Then $\ast_{\mathcal{C}(\ast)} = \ast$.*

Proof. Let $\lambda \in L_*$. We need to show $[\ast(\lambda)] = \{x \mid x \preceq y \text{ for some } y \in \min_{<}([\neg\lambda])\}$.

For the left-to-right inclusion, suppose $x \in [\ast(\lambda)]$. Let $\min_{<}([\neg\lambda]) = \{y_1, \dots, y_k\}$ and $[\neg\lambda] \setminus \min_{<}([\neg\lambda]) = \{z_1, \dots, z_l\}$. We will show that $\ast(\lambda) \vdash \ast(\bigwedge_{i=1}^k \neg y_i)$. If we can show this then $\ast(\lambda) \vdash \bigvee_{i=1}^k \ast(\neg y_i)$ will follow from **(∗5)**, and then from $x \in [\ast(\lambda)]$ we can deduce $x \in [\ast(\neg y_i)]$ for some i , i.e., $x \preceq y$ for some $y \in \min_{<}([\neg\lambda])$ as required. So, to show $\ast(\lambda) \vdash \ast(\bigwedge_{i=1}^k \neg y_i)$ first note that $\lambda \equiv (\bigwedge_{i=1}^k \neg y_i) \wedge (\bigwedge_{i=1}^l \neg z_i)$, hence what we need to show is:

$$\ast\left(\left(\bigwedge_{i=1}^k \neg y_i\right) \wedge \left(\bigwedge_{i=1}^l \neg z_i\right)\right) \vdash \ast\left(\bigwedge_{i=1}^k \neg y_i\right).$$

This will follow by **(∗4)**, provided we can show

$$\ast\left(\left(\bigwedge_{i=1}^k \neg y_i\right) \wedge \left(\bigwedge_{i=1}^l \neg z_i\right)\right) \vdash \bigwedge_{i=1}^l \neg z_i. \quad (1)$$

Let $m \in \{1, \dots, l\}$. Since $z_m \notin \min_{<}([\neg\lambda])$ we know there must be some $j \in \{1, \dots, k\}$ such that $y_j < z_m$, i.e., $\ast(\neg y_j \wedge \neg z_m) \vdash \neg z_m$. But then by **(∗3)**

$$\ast\left(\left(\bigwedge_{i=1}^k \neg y_i\right) \wedge \left(\bigwedge_{i=1}^l \neg z_i\right)\right) \vdash \neg z_m.$$

Since this holds for each $m = 1, \dots, l$ we obtain (1) as required.

To show the right-to-left inclusion, suppose $x \preceq y$ for some $y \in \min_{<}([\neg\lambda])$. Then $\ast(\neg y) \not\vdash \neg x$ and $\ast(\neg y \wedge \neg z) \not\vdash \neg y$ for all $z \in [\neg\lambda]$. We want to show $\ast(\lambda) \not\vdash \neg x$. This will be proved if we can show $\ast(\neg y) \vdash \ast(\lambda)$. By **(∗C)** this will be proved if we can show $y \wedge \ast(\neg y) \vdash \neg\lambda \wedge \ast(\lambda)$ which, since $y \vdash \ast(\neg y)$ (by **(∗1)**) and $y \in [\neg\lambda]$, is equivalent to showing $y \vdash \ast(\lambda)$. We know $y \vdash \ast(\neg y \wedge \neg z)$ for all $z \in [\neg\lambda]$. By repeated use of **(∗E')** we obtain $y \vdash \ast(\bigwedge_{z \in [\neg\lambda]} \neg z)$. By **(∗2)** this is equivalent to the required $y \vdash \ast(\lambda)$. \square

Thus, to summarise, the family of removal functions defined from semi-modular contexts is completely characterised by the following rules:

- (∗1)** $\ast(\lambda) \not\vdash \lambda$
- (∗2)** If $\lambda_1 \equiv \lambda_2$ then $\ast(\lambda_1) \equiv \ast(\lambda_2)$
- (∗3)** If $\ast(\lambda \wedge \chi) \vdash \chi$ then $\ast(\lambda \wedge \chi \wedge \psi) \vdash \chi$
- (∗C)** If $\ast(\lambda) \wedge \neg\lambda \vdash \ast(\chi) \wedge \neg\chi$ then $\ast(\lambda) \vdash \ast(\chi)$
- (∗5)** $\ast(\lambda \wedge \chi) \vdash \ast(\lambda) \vee \ast(\chi)$
- (∗6a)** If $\ast(\lambda \wedge \chi) \vdash \chi$ then $\ast(\lambda) \vdash \ast(\lambda \wedge \chi)$
- (∗E)** $\neg(\lambda \wedge \chi) \wedge \ast(\lambda) \wedge \ast(\chi) \vdash \ast(\lambda \wedge \chi)$

In the next section we will later look at a few more reasonable postulates which are not covered by the above list.

4 Transitivity and Priority

In this section we look at imposing an extra couple of properties on semi-modular contexts $\mathcal{C} = (\prec, \prec)$, both of which were investigated in the case of modular contexts in [7]. There it was shown how the resulting classes of removal functions still remain general enough to include a great many of the classes which have been previously proposed in the context of modular removal.

The first property is the transitivity of \preceq , thus making \preceq a preorder. (Recall \preceq is the converse complement of \prec , so this is equivalent to making \prec modular.) According to our above interpretation of \preceq this means *if there is no reason to treat y more favourably than x , and no reason to treat z more favourably than y then there is no reason to treat z more favourably than x .*

Proposition 4.1 (i). *If \preceq is transitive then $\ast_{\mathcal{C}}$ satisfies the following strengthening of $(\ast\mathbf{C})$:*

$(\ast\mathbf{C}+)$ *If $\ast(\lambda) \wedge \neg\lambda \vdash \ast(\chi)$ then $\ast(\lambda) \vdash \ast(\chi)$*

(ii). *If \ast satisfies $(\ast\mathbf{C}+)$ and $(\ast\mathbf{1})$ then the relation \preceq in $\mathcal{C}(\ast)$ is transitive.*

Proof. (i). Suppose $\ast_{\mathcal{C}}(\lambda) \wedge \neg\lambda \vdash \ast_{\mathcal{C}}(\chi)$ and let $x \in [\ast_{\mathcal{C}}(\lambda)]$. We must show $x \in [\ast_{\mathcal{C}}(\chi)]$. But from $x \in [\ast_{\mathcal{C}}(\lambda)]$ we know $x \preceq y$ for some $y \in \min_{\prec}([\neg\lambda])$. By Proposition 3.5, $y \in [\ast_{\mathcal{C}}(\lambda) \wedge \neg\lambda]$. From the assumption $\ast_{\mathcal{C}}(\lambda) \wedge \neg\lambda \vdash \ast_{\mathcal{C}}(\chi)$ we deduce $y \in [\ast_{\mathcal{C}}(\chi)]$, i.e., $y \preceq z$ for some $z \in \min_{\prec}([\neg\chi])$. Then by transitivity of \preceq we get also $x \preceq z$ and so $x \in [\ast_{\mathcal{C}}(\chi)]$ as required.

(ii). Suppose $x \in [\ast(\neg y)]$ and $y \in [\ast(\neg z)]$. We must show $x \in [\ast(\neg z)]$. But from $y \in [\ast(\neg z)]$ and $y \vdash \ast(\neg y)$ ($(\ast\mathbf{1})$) we know $\ast(\neg y) \wedge y \vdash \ast(\neg z)$. Applying $(\ast\mathbf{C}+)$ to this yields $\ast(\neg y) \vdash \ast(\neg z)$ from which we obtain the required $x \in [\ast(\neg z)]$ from $x \in [\ast(\neg y)]$. \square

Note this property is a great deal simpler than the one used to characterise transitivity of \preceq in the modular context in [7]. It can be re-written as: If $\ast^{\mathbf{R}}(\neg\lambda) \vdash \ast(\chi)$ then $\ast(\lambda) \vdash \ast(\chi)$. It says that if the belief set following removal of χ is contained in the belief set following the *revision* by $\neg\lambda$, then it must be contained also in the belief set following the removal of λ . This seems like a reasonable property.

Corollary 4.2 *For any removal function \ast , the following are equivalent:*

(i). *\ast is generated by a semi-modular context $\mathcal{C} = (\prec, \prec)$ such that \preceq is transitive.* (ii). *\ast satisfies the list of rules given at the end of Section 3, with $(\ast\mathbf{C})$ replaced by $(\ast\mathbf{C}+)$.*

Now consider the following property of a context $\mathcal{C} = (\prec, \prec)$:

(\mathbf{CP}) *If $x \prec y$ and $y \not\prec x$ then $x < y$*

This, too, looks reasonable: if \mathcal{A} has an explicit reason to hold x more plausible than y , but not vice versa, then in the final reckoning he should hold x to be strictly more plausible than y . Consider the following property of removal functions:

$(\ast\mathbf{P})$ *If $\ast(\lambda) \vdash \chi$ and $\ast(\chi) \not\prec \lambda$ then $\ast(\lambda \wedge \chi) \vdash \chi$*

This property is briefly mentioned as *Priority* in [5], and is also briefly mentioned right at the end of [10]. It can be read as saying that if λ is excluded following removal of χ , but not vice versa, then χ is strictly more entrenched than λ . **For the case of modular removal**, we can obtain the following exact correspondence between **(CP)** and **(*P)**:

Proposition 4.3 (i). *If \mathcal{C} is a modular context satisfying **(CP)** then $*_{\mathcal{C}}$ satisfies **(*P)**.*
(ii). *If $*$ satisfies **(*P)** then $\mathcal{C}(*)$ satisfies **(CP)**.*

Proof. (i). Suppose $*_{\mathcal{C}}(\lambda) \vdash \chi$, $*_{\mathcal{C}}(\chi) \not\vdash \lambda$ and, for contradiction, $*_{\mathcal{C}}(\lambda \wedge \chi) \not\vdash \chi$. Then from $*_{\mathcal{C}}(\chi) \not\vdash \lambda$ we know there exist x, y such that $x \in [\neg\lambda]$, $x \preceq y$ and $y \in \min_{<}([\neg\chi])$, while from $*_{\mathcal{C}}(\lambda \wedge \chi) \not\vdash \chi$ we know there exist z, w such that $z \in [\neg\chi]$, $z \preceq w$ and $w \in \min_{<}([\neg(\lambda \wedge \chi)])$. We have the following inequalities:

$$w \leq x \preceq y \leq z \preceq w$$

To see this, note $x \preceq y$ and $z \preceq w$ are both given, $w \leq x$ follows since $x \in [\neg\lambda]$ and by modularity and the minimality of w , while $y \leq z$ follows from $z \in [\neg\chi]$ and by modularity and the minimality of y . Since $\preceq \subseteq \leq$ this yields $w \leq x \leq y \leq z \leq w$, thus $w \sim x \sim y \sim z$, and in particular $x \not\prec y$. Using this with $x \preceq y$ and **(CP)** yields $y \preceq x$. Now, the above proved inequality also gives $x \leq w$, which using the minimality of w is enough to show $x \in \min_{<}([\neg\lambda])$. Hence $y \in [*_{\mathcal{C}}(\lambda)]$. But $y \in [\neg\chi]$, contradicting $*_{\mathcal{C}}(\lambda) \vdash \chi$.

(ii). We will show $x \preceq y$ and $y \not\prec x$ implies $x < y$. So suppose $x \preceq y$ and $y \not\prec x$, i.e., by definition of $\mathcal{C}(*)$, $*(\neg y) \not\vdash \neg x$ and $*(\neg x) \vdash \neg y$. Then applying **(*P)** to this gives $*(\neg x \wedge \neg y) \vdash \neg y$, i.e., $x < y$ as required. \square

The proof of Proposition 4.3(i) makes critical use of the modularity of $<$. It turns out that **(*P)** is *not* sound for general semi-modular contexts, even if we insist on **(CP)**.

Example 4.4 *Suppose $L = \{p, q\}$ and that $< = \{(01, 11)\}$ while $\preceq = \{(01, 11)\}$ (strictly speaking the reflexive closure of this). One can verify that \mathcal{C} is a semi-modular context and that **(CP)** is satisfied. Now let $\lambda = p \vee \neg q$ and $\chi = \neg p$. Then $[*_{\mathcal{C}}(\lambda)] = \{01\}$, $[*_{\mathcal{C}}(\chi)] = \{11, 01, 10\}$ and $[*_{\mathcal{C}}(\lambda \wedge \chi)] = \{01, 10\}$ and we have $*_{\mathcal{C}}(\lambda) \vdash \chi$, $*_{\mathcal{C}}(\chi) \not\vdash \lambda$, and $*_{\mathcal{C}}(\lambda \wedge \chi) \not\vdash \chi$. Hence **(*P)** is not satisfied.*

The question now is, which postulate corresponds to **(CP)** for general semi-modular contexts? Here is the answer:

Proposition 4.5 (i). *If \mathcal{C} is a semi-modular context which satisfies **(CP)**, then $*_{\mathcal{C}}$ satisfies the following rule:*

(*P') *If $*(\lambda) \vdash \chi$ and $*(\chi) \vdash *(\lambda \wedge \chi)$ then $*(\chi) \vdash \lambda$*

(ii). *If $*$ satisfies **(*P')**, plus **(*C)** and **(*1)**, then $\mathcal{C}(*)$ satisfies **(CP)**.*

Proof. (i). Suppose for contradiction $*_{\mathcal{C}}(\lambda) \vdash \chi$, $*_{\mathcal{C}}(\chi) \vdash *_{\mathcal{C}}(\lambda \wedge \chi)$ and $*_{\mathcal{C}}(\chi) \not\vdash \lambda$. Then from $*_{\mathcal{C}}(\chi) \not\vdash \lambda$ we know there exists $x \in [*_{\mathcal{C}}(\chi) \wedge \neg\lambda]$. Since $*_{\mathcal{C}}(\chi) \vdash *_{\mathcal{C}}(\lambda \wedge \chi)$ this gives $x \in [*_{\mathcal{C}}(\lambda \wedge \chi) \wedge \neg\lambda]$, which in turn gives $x \in [*_{\mathcal{C}}(\lambda) \wedge \neg\lambda]$ using **(*3')**. Hence $x \in \min_{<}([\neg\lambda])$ by Proposition 3.5. Now since $x \in [*_{\mathcal{C}}(\chi)]$ there exists $y \in \min_{<}([\neg\chi])$ such that $x \preceq y$. Since $y \in \min_{<}([\neg\chi])$ we have $y \in [*_{\mathcal{C}}(\chi) \wedge \neg\chi]$ by

Proposition 3.5. Then, since $\ast_c(\chi) \vdash \ast_c(\lambda \wedge \chi)$ and $\neg\chi \vdash \neg(\lambda \wedge \chi)$ this gives $y \in [\ast_c(\lambda \wedge \chi) \wedge \neg(\lambda \wedge \chi)]$ and so also $y \in \min_{<}([\neg(\lambda \wedge \chi)])$ by Proposition 3.5. If $y \not\preceq x$ then $x < y$ by (a), contradicting the minimality of y . Hence $y \preceq x$ so $y \in [\ast_c(\lambda)]$. But $y \in [\neg\chi]$, contradicting $\ast_c(\lambda) \vdash \chi$ as required.

(ii). Suppose $x \prec y$ and $y \not\preceq x$. Then $\ast(\neg y) \not\preceq \neg x$ and $\ast(\neg x) \vdash \neg y$. We must show $\ast(\neg x \wedge \neg y) \vdash \neg y$, equivalently $y \not\preceq \ast(\neg x \wedge \neg y)$. But from $\ast(\neg y) \not\preceq \neg x$ and $\ast(\neg x) \vdash \neg y$ we obtain $\ast(\neg y) \not\preceq \ast(\neg x \wedge \neg y)$ using $(\ast\mathbf{P}')$. From this and $(\ast\mathbf{C})$ we get $\ast(\neg y) \wedge y \not\preceq \ast(\neg x \wedge \neg y) \wedge (x \vee y)$. Since $y \vdash \ast(\neg y)$ via $(\ast\mathbf{1})$ this is equivalent to $y \not\preceq \ast(\neg x \wedge \neg y) \wedge (x \vee y)$. Since obviously $y \vdash (x \vee y)$ we must have $y \not\preceq \ast(\neg x \wedge \neg y)$ as required. \square

It is straightforward to see $(\ast\mathbf{P}')$ is weaker than $(\ast\mathbf{P})$ given $(\ast\mathbf{1})$, while it implies $(\ast\mathbf{P})$ given $(\ast\mathbf{6})$.

5 Finite Base-Generated Removal

In this section we mention a concrete and important subfamily of our general family of removal functions, the ideas behind which can be seen already throughout the literature on nonmonotonic reasoning and belief change (see in particular [5] for a general treatment in a belief removal context). Given any, possibly inconsistent, set Σ of sentences, let $\text{cons}(\Sigma)$ denote the set of all consistent subsets of Σ . We assume agent \mathcal{A} is in possession of a finite set Σ of sentences which are possible *assumptions* or *defaults*, together with a strict preference ordering \Subset on $\text{cons}(\Sigma)$ (with sets “higher” in the ordering assumed more preferred). We assume the following two properties of \Subset :

($\Sigma\mathbf{1}$) \Subset is a strict partial order

($\Sigma\mathbf{2}$) If $A \subset B$ then $A \Subset B$

($\Sigma\mathbf{2}$) is a monotonicity requirement stating a given set of defaults is strictly preferred to all its proper subsets.

Definition 5.1 *If $\Sigma \subseteq L$ is a finite set of sentences and \Subset is a binary relation over $\text{cons}(\Sigma)$ satisfying **($\Sigma\mathbf{1}$)** and **($\Sigma\mathbf{2}$)**. Then we call $\Sigma = \langle \Sigma, \Subset \rangle$ a prioritised default base. If in addition \Subset is modular then we call Σ a modular prioritised default base.*

Lemma 5.2 (a). *If $A \supseteq B$ and $B \ni C$ then $A \ni C$.* (b) *If $A \ni B$ and $B \supseteq C$ then $A \ni C$.*

Proof. For (a), if $A = B$ then it’s obvious. Otherwise if $A \supset B$ then $A \ni B$ by **($\Sigma\mathbf{1}$)** and we conclude using the transitivity of \ni . (b) is proved similarly. \square

In practice we might expect the ordering \Subset over $\text{cons}(\Sigma)$ to itself be generated from some (not necessarily total) preorder \preceq over the individual sentences in Σ (again we equate “higher” with “more preferred”). Let E_1, \dots, E_k be the equivalence classes of $\text{cons}(\Sigma)$ under such a \preceq , themselves ordered in the natural way by \preceq , i.e., $E_1 \preceq E_2$ iff $\alpha \preceq \beta$ for some $\alpha \in E_1$ and $\beta \in E_2$. Then to give but two prominent examples from the literature (where \prec is the strict part of \preceq):

Inclusion-Based [9] $A \Subset_{ib} B$ iff $\exists i$ s.t. $E_i \cap A \subset E_i \cap B$ and $\forall j$ s.t. $E_i \prec E_j$,
 $E_j \cap B = E_j \cap A$

Generalised-Lexicographic [26] $A \Subset_{gl} B$ iff $\forall i$, if $|E_i \cap B| < |E_i \cap A|$ then $\exists j$ s.t.
 $E_i \prec E_j$ and $|E_j \cap A| < |E_j \cap B|$. Then \Subset_{gl} is the strict part of \Subset_{gl} .

We remark that the inclusion-based preference usually assumes the underlying order \succsim over Σ is total. For the generalised-lexicographic example, note if the preorder \succsim over Σ is total then \Subset_{gl} becomes modular and the generalised-lexicographic example reduces to the standard lexicographic case familiar from [3, 16].

Proposition 5.3 *Let Σ be a finite set of sentences equipped with some preorder \succsim over its elements, and let \Subset_{ib} and \Subset_{gl} be relations over $\text{cons}(\Sigma)$ defined from \succsim as above. Then \Subset_{gl} satisfies **($\Sigma 1$)** and **($\Sigma 2$)**, while if \succsim is total then so does \Subset_{ib} .*

Proof. Turning first to \Subset_{gl} , it is obviously irreflexive, while by Proposition 1 of [26] (the first bullet point in this result) we know \Subset_{gl} is a preorder and in particular is transitive. From this it is easy to see \Subset_{gl} is transitive, and so \Subset_{gl} forms a strict partial order, i.e., **($\Sigma 1$)** is satisfied. As for **($\Sigma 2$)**, suppose $A \subset B$. We know already by Proposition 1 of [26] that $A \Subset_{gl} B$ whenever $A \subseteq B$, so it remains to show $B \not\Subset_{gl} A$. But since $A \subset B$ we know $|E_i \cap A| \leq |E_i \cap B|$ for all i , with strict inequality for at least one i . Let $E_{i'}$ be maximal under \prec such that $|E_{i'} \cap A| < |E_{i'} \cap B|$. Then $|E_i \cap A| \leq |E_i \cap B|$ for all E_i such that $E_{i'} \prec E_i$. This is enough to show $B \not\Subset_{gl} A$.

Now turning to \Subset_{ib} , assume \succsim is a total preorder. Then it is easy to show **($\Sigma 1$)** and **($\Sigma 2$)**. We remark that if \succsim is not total, then \Subset_{ib} will be irreflexive but not transitive in general. Indeed it will not be asymmetric (e.g., take Σ to consist only of two incomparable elements α, β and set $A = \{\alpha\}$ and $B = \{\beta\}$. Then both $A \Subset_{ib} B$ and $B \Subset_{ib} A$). \square

How does the agent use a prioritised default base $\Sigma = \langle \Sigma, \Subset \rangle$ to remove beliefs? For $\Sigma \subseteq L$ and $\lambda \in L_*$ let $\text{cons}(\Sigma, \lambda) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \{S \in \text{cons}(\Sigma) \mid S \not\prec \lambda\}$. Then from Σ we may define a removal function $*_{\Sigma}$ by setting, for each $\lambda \in L_*$,

$$*_{\Sigma}(\lambda) = \bigvee \left\{ \bigwedge S \mid S \in \max_{\Subset} \text{cons}(\Sigma, \lambda) \right\}.$$

In other words, after removing λ , \mathcal{A} will believe precisely those sentences which are consequences of *all maximally preferred* subsets of Σ which do not imply λ .

We will now show how the family of removal functions generated from prioritised default bases fits into our general family. From a given $\Sigma = \langle \Sigma, \Subset \rangle$ we may define a context $\mathcal{C}(\Sigma) = (\prec, \prec)$ as follows. Let $\text{sent}_{\Sigma}(x) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \{\alpha \in \Sigma \mid x \in [\alpha]\}$. Then

- $x < y$ iff $\text{sent}_{\Sigma}(y) \Subset \text{sent}_{\Sigma}(x)$
- $x \prec y$ iff $\text{sent}_{\Sigma}(x) \not\Subset \text{sent}_{\Sigma}(y)$

Thus we define x to be more plausible than y iff the set of sentences in Σ satisfied by x is more preferred than the set of sentences in Σ satisfied by y . Meanwhile we have the natural interpretation for \prec that \mathcal{A} has a reason to hold x to be more plausible than y precisely when one of the sentences in Σ is satisfied by x but not y .

Theorem 5.4 (i). $\mathcal{C}(\Sigma)$ defined above forms a semi-modular context (which is modular if \sqsubseteq is modular). (ii). \preceq is transitive and the condition **(CP)** from Section 4 holds. (iii). $\ast_{\Sigma} = \ast_{\mathcal{C}(\Sigma)}$.

Proof. (i). **(C1)**. First we have to show $<$ is irreflexive and transitive. This follows from the irreflexivity and transitivity of \sqsubseteq .

(C2). Irreflexivity of $<$, i.e., reflexivity of \preceq , is immediate from reflexivity of \supseteq .

(C3a). We need to show if $\text{sent}_{\Sigma}(x) \supseteq \text{sent}_{\Sigma}(y)$ and $\text{sent}_{\Sigma}(z) \ni \text{sent}_{\Sigma}(x)$ then $\text{sent}_{\Sigma}(z) \ni \text{sent}_{\Sigma}(y)$. This follows from Lemma 5.2(b).

(ii). **Transitivity of \preceq** . Immediate from the transitivity of \supseteq .

(CP). Follows from condition **(Σ1)**.

(iii). Let $\lambda \in L_{\ast}$ and $\mathcal{C} = \mathcal{C}(\Sigma)$. We must show $[\ast_{\mathcal{C}}(\lambda)] = [\ast_{\Sigma}(\lambda)]$.

For the left-to-right inclusion let $x \in [\ast_{\mathcal{C}}(\lambda)]$. Then $x \preceq y$, i.e., $\text{sent}_{\Sigma}(x) \supseteq \text{sent}_{\Sigma}(y)$, for some $y \in \min_{<}([\neg\lambda])$. To show $x \in [\ast_{\Sigma}(\lambda)]$ it suffices to show $x \in [S]$ for some $S \in \max_{\ni} \text{cons}(\Sigma, \lambda)$. We put $S = \text{sent}_{\Sigma}(y)$. The fact $x \in [S]$ follows from $\text{sent}_{\Sigma}(x) \supseteq \text{sent}_{\Sigma}(y)$. Since $y \in [\neg\lambda] \cap [S]$ we have $S \in \text{cons}(\Sigma, \lambda)$. It remains to show $T \not\ni S$ for all $T \in \text{cons}(\Sigma, \lambda)$. But suppose it were the case that $T \in \text{cons}(\Sigma, \lambda)$ and $T \ni S$. Since $T \not\vdash \lambda$ there exists $z \in [T] \cap [\neg\lambda]$. Clearly we have $\text{sent}_{\Sigma}(z) \supseteq T$, so combining this with $T \ni S$ gives $\text{sent}_{\Sigma}(z) \ni S$, i.e., $\text{sent}_{\Sigma}(z) \ni \text{sent}_{\Sigma}(y)$ by Lemma 5.2(a) and so $z < y$. But this contradicts the minimality of y . Hence $T \not\ni S$ for all $T \in \text{cons}(\Sigma, \lambda)$ as required.

For the right-to-left inclusion let $x \in [\ast_{\Sigma}(\lambda)]$, i.e., $x \in [S]$ for some $S \in \max_{\ni} \text{cons}(\Sigma, \lambda)$. We must find some $y \in \min_{<}([\neg\lambda])$ such that $\text{sent}_{\Sigma}(x) \supseteq \text{sent}_{\Sigma}(y)$. Since $S \in \text{cons}(\Sigma, \lambda)$ we know $S \not\vdash \lambda$ and so there exists $y \in [S] \cap [\neg\lambda]$. Since $y \in [S]$ we know $\text{sent}_{\Sigma}(y) \supseteq S$. We claim in fact $\text{sent}_{\Sigma}(y) = S$. For if $\text{sent}_{\Sigma}(y) \supset S$ then $\text{sent}_{\Sigma}(y) \ni S$ and then by the maximality of S we get $y \vdash \lambda$ - contradiction. Hence $\text{sent}_{\Sigma}(y) = S$ and so, since $x \in [S]$, we know $\text{sent}_{\Sigma}(x) \supseteq \text{sent}_{\Sigma}(y)$. It remains to show $y \in \min_{<}([\neg\lambda])$. But if $z < y$ for some $z \in [\neg\lambda]$, i.e., $\text{sent}_{\Sigma}(z) \ni \text{sent}_{\Sigma}(y)$ and so again using the maximality of $S = \text{sent}_{\Sigma}(y)$ we obtain $\text{sent}_{\Sigma}(z) \vdash \lambda$, contradicting $z \in [\neg\lambda]$. \square

Thus we have shown that every removal function generated by a prioritised default base may *always* be generated by a semi-modular context which furthermore satisfies the two conditions on contexts mentioned in the previous Section. By the results of the previous section, this means we automatically obtain a list of sound postulates for the default base-generated removals.

Corollary 5.5 *Let Σ be any prioritised default base. Then \ast_{Σ} satisfies all the rules listed at the end of Chapter 3, as well as $(\ast\mathbf{C}+)$ and $(\ast\mathbf{P}')$ from the last section.*

Note we have shown how every prioritised default base gives rise to a semi-modular context satisfying \preceq -transitivity and **(CP)**. An open question is whether *every* such context arises in this way.

6 AGM Preferential Removal

Recall that three of the basic AGM postulates for contraction do not hold in general for the removal functions generated by semi-modular contexts, namely Inclusion, Recovery and Vacuity. Given the influence of AGM contraction on work in this area, it is a

worthwhile exercise to see if it is possible to capture all the AGM postulates in our proposed framework.

In this section we show how each of these rules can be captured. In [7] it was shown already how they may be captured within the class of modular context-generated removal. It turns out that more or less the same constructions can be used for the wider class considered here, although some complications arise regarding Vacuity.

6.1 Inclusion

The Inclusion rule is written in our setting as follows:

$$(*\mathbf{I}) \quad *(\perp) \vdash *(\lambda)$$

To capture $(*\mathbf{I})$ for any removal generated from any semi-modular context $\mathcal{C} = (<, \prec)$, we need only to require the following condition on \mathcal{C} :

$$(\mathbf{CI}) \quad \min_{<}(W) \subseteq \min_{\prec}(W)$$

According to our interpretation of \prec , (\mathbf{CI}) is stating that, for any world x , if \mathcal{A} has some explicit reason to favour some world y over x (i.e., $y \prec x$) then in the final reckoning \mathcal{A} must hold *some* world z (not necessarily the same as y) more plausible than x (i.e., $z < x$).

Proposition 6.1 (i). *If \mathcal{C} satisfies (\mathbf{CI}) then $*_{\mathcal{C}}$ satisfies $(*\mathbf{I})$.* (ii). *If $*$ satisfies $(*\mathbf{I})$ then $\mathcal{C}(*)$ satisfies (\mathbf{CI}) .*

Proof. (i). Suppose $x \in [*_{\mathcal{C}}(\perp)] = [*_{\mathcal{C}}(\perp) \wedge \top]$. Then $x \in \min_{<}([\top]) = \min_{<}(W)$ by Proposition 3.5. Then by (\mathbf{CI}) for any λ we have $x \preceq y$ for all $y \in \min_{<}([\neg\lambda])$ and so $x \in [*_{\mathcal{C}}(\lambda)]$ as required.

(ii). Suppose $x \in \min_{<}(W)$. Then $x \in [*_{\mathcal{C}}(\perp)]$ as in part (i) by Proposition 3.5. By $(*\mathbf{I})$ we know $*(\perp) \vdash *(\neg y)$, so we get $x \in [*_{\mathcal{C}}(\neg y)]$, i.e., $x \preceq y$ as required. \square

Given any removal function $*$ we can always obtain a removal function which satisfies $(*\mathbf{I})$ by taking the *incarceration* $*^{\mathbf{I}}$ of $*$ [6]:

$$*^{\mathbf{I}}(\lambda) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} *(\perp) \vee *(\lambda).$$

Or alternatively we can modify a given context $\mathcal{C} = (<, \prec)$ into $\mathcal{C}^{\mathbf{I}} = (<, \prec^{\mathbf{I}})$, where $x \preceq^{\mathbf{I}} y$ iff either $x \preceq y$ or $x \in \min_{<}(W)$. It is easy to check $\mathcal{C}^{\mathbf{I}} = \mathcal{C}(*^{\mathbf{I}})$.

6.2 Recovery

The Recovery rule is written as follows:

$$(*\mathbf{R}) \quad *(\lambda) \wedge \lambda \vdash *(\perp)$$

The corresponding property on contexts $\mathcal{C} = (<, \prec)$ is:

$$(\mathbf{CR}) \quad \text{If } y \notin \min_{<}(W) \text{ and } x \neq y \text{ then } x \prec y$$

Thus the only worlds $\nabla_{\preceq}(x)$ contains, other than x itself, are worlds in $\min_{<}(W)$.

Proposition 6.2 (i). If \mathcal{C} satisfies **(CR)** then $\ast_{\mathcal{C}}$ satisfies **(\astR)**. (ii). If \ast satisfies **(\astR)** then $\mathcal{C}(\ast)$ satisfies **(CR)**.

Proof. (i). Suppose $x \in [\ast_{\mathcal{C}}(\lambda) \wedge \lambda]$. Then $x \preceq y$ for some $y \in \min_{<}([\neg\lambda])$. If $x = y$ then $x \in [\neg\lambda]$ – contradiction. Hence by **(CR)** we get $x \in \min_{<}(W)$, i.e., $x \in [\ast_{\mathcal{C}}(\perp)]$.

(ii). Suppose $x \preceq y$, i.e., $x \in [\ast(\neg y)]$. If $x = y$ we are done so assume $x \neq y$. Then $x \in [\neg y]$. Then from $x \in [\ast(\neg y) \wedge \neg y]$ we get $x \in [\ast(\perp)]$ by **(\astR)**. This is equivalent to the desired $x \in \min_{<}(W)$. \square

Note the combination of **(CI)** and **(CR)** specifies \prec , equivalently \preceq , uniquely in terms of $<$, viz. $x \preceq_{agm} y$ iff $x = y$ or $x \in \min_{<}(W)$, and we obtain the removal recipe of AGM contraction, in which removal of λ boils down to just adding the $<$ -minimal $\neg\lambda$ -worlds to the $<$ -minimal worlds:

$$[\ast_{agm}(\lambda)] = \min_{<}(W) \cup \min_{<}([\neg\lambda]).$$

It is easy to check that the resulting context \mathcal{C} satisfies condition **(C3a)** and thus forms a semi-modular context. It is also easy to check **(CP)** is satisfied and that the above-defined \preceq_{agm} is transitive. Thus the above \ast_{agm} also satisfies **(\astC+)** and **(\astP')** from Chapter 4. It can also be shown to satisfy **(\ast6b)**.

6.3 Vacuity

The Vacuity rule is written as follows:

$$(\ast\mathbf{V}) \text{ If } \ast(\perp) \not\vdash \lambda \text{ then } \ast(\lambda) \equiv \ast(\perp)$$

Unlike in the modular case, where Vacuity is known to follow from Inclusion for modular removal functions [7], **(\astV)** does not even hold in general for the above preferential AGM contraction \ast_{agm} . This was essentially noticed, in a revision context, in [4].

Example 6.3 Let $L = \{p, q\}$ and $< = \{(11, 01)\}$. So $[\ast_{agm}(\perp)] = \{00, 11, 10\}$. Let $\lambda = p$. Then we have $\ast_{agm}(\perp) \not\vdash \lambda$ (because $00 \in [\ast_{agm}(\perp)]$), but $\min_{<}([\neg\lambda]) = \{00, 01\}$, so $[\ast_{agm}(\lambda)] = \min_{<}(W) \cup \min_{<}([\neg\lambda]) = W \neq [\ast_{agm}(\perp)]$.

In order to ensure \ast_{agm} satisfies **(\astV)** it is necessary, as is done in [14], to enforce the following property on $<$.

$$(<\mathbf{V}) \forall x, y ((x \in \min_{<}(W) \wedge y \notin \min_{<}(W)) \rightarrow x < y).$$

In other words all $<$ -minimal worlds can be compared with, and are below, every world which is not $<$ -minimal. For general semi-modular contexts $\mathcal{C} = (<, \prec)$ we also require the following condition, which is weaker than **(CI)**:

$$(\mathbf{CV}) \text{ If } x, y \in \min_{<}(W) \text{ then } x \not\prec y$$

This property says that for any two of his $<$ -minimal worlds, \mathcal{A} will not have explicit reason to hold one to be more plausible than the other.

For basic removal [7] the following direction of Vacuity is always valid:

($\ast\mathbf{V}_1$) If $\ast(\perp) \not\vdash \lambda$ then $\ast(\lambda) \vdash \ast(\perp)$

Proposition 6.4 ($\ast\mathbf{V}_1$) is not valid for $\ast_{\mathcal{C}}$, even if \mathcal{C} satisfies ($\mathcal{C}\mathbf{V}$).

Proof. For the counterexample, assume $L = \{p, q\}$ and let $< = \{(01, 11), (10, 00)\}$ and $\preceq = \{(01, 10), (10, 01)\}$ (plus reflexivity). Then $[\ast_{\mathcal{C}}(\perp)] = \{01, 10\}$, so \mathcal{C} clearly satisfies ($\mathcal{C}\mathbf{V}$). Let $\lambda = p$. Clearly $\ast_{\mathcal{C}}(\perp) \not\vdash p$, while $[\ast_{\mathcal{C}}(p)] = \{01, 10, 00\} \not\subseteq [\ast_{\mathcal{C}}(\perp)]$. \square

But if we insist on ($<\mathbf{V}$) as well as ($\mathcal{C}\mathbf{V}$) then we get it:

Proposition 6.5 (i). If \mathcal{C} satisfies ($\mathcal{C}\mathbf{V}$) and ($<\mathbf{V}$) then $\ast_{\mathcal{C}}$ satisfies ($\ast\mathbf{V}$). (ii). If \ast satisfies ($\ast\mathbf{V}$) then $\mathcal{C}(\ast)$ satisfies ($\mathcal{C}\mathbf{V}$).

Proof. (i). Suppose $\ast_{\mathcal{C}}(\perp) \not\vdash \lambda$. Then there exists $x_0 \in [\ast_{\mathcal{C}}(\perp) \wedge \neg\lambda]$. By ($\ast\mathbf{3}'$) we know $\ast_{\mathcal{C}}(\perp) \wedge \neg\lambda \vdash \ast_{\mathcal{C}}(\lambda)$ so $x_0 \in [\ast_{\mathcal{C}}(\lambda) \wedge \neg\lambda]$.

To show $\ast_{\mathcal{C}}(\perp) \vdash \ast_{\mathcal{C}}(\lambda)$ suppose $y \in [\ast_{\mathcal{C}}(\perp)]$. Then $y \in \min_{<}(W)$. Since also $x_0 \in [\ast_{\mathcal{C}}(\perp)]$ we know also $x_0 \in \min_{<}(W)$ and so $y \preceq x_0$ by ($\mathcal{C}\mathbf{V}$). But from $x_0 \in [\ast_{\mathcal{C}}(\lambda) \wedge \neg\lambda]$ we get $x_0 \in \min_{<}([\neg\lambda])$ by Proposition 3.5 which gives $y \in [\ast_{\mathcal{C}}(\lambda)]$ as required.

To show $\ast_{\mathcal{C}}(\lambda) \vdash \ast_{\mathcal{C}}(\perp)$ it suffices by ($\ast\mathbf{C}$) to show $\ast_{\mathcal{C}}(\lambda) \wedge \neg\lambda \vdash \ast_{\mathcal{C}}(\perp)$. So let $y \in [\ast_{\mathcal{C}}(\lambda) \wedge \neg\lambda]$. Then $y \in \min_{<}([\neg\lambda])$ by Proposition 3.5. We must show $y \in [\ast_{\mathcal{C}}(\perp)]$, i.e., $y \in \min_{<}(W)$. But if $y \notin \min_{<}(W)$ then $x_0 < y$ using ($<\mathbf{V}$). But since $x_0 \in [\neg\lambda]$ this contradicts $y \in \min_{<}([\neg\lambda])$. Hence $y \in \min_{<}(W)$ as required.

(ii). If $x \in \min_{<}(W)$ then $x \vdash \ast(\perp)$ and so $\ast(\perp) \not\vdash \neg x$. Then applying ($\ast\mathbf{V}$) to this gives $\ast(\neg x) \equiv \ast(\perp)$. So if both $x, y \in \min_{<}(W)$ then $\ast(\neg x) \equiv \ast(\perp) \equiv \ast(\neg y)$. Hence $\ast(\neg y) \not\vdash \neg x$ by ($\ast\mathbf{1}$), i.e., $x \preceq y$ as required to show ($\mathcal{C}\mathbf{V}$). \square

7 Conclusion

In this paper we introduced a family of removal functions, generalising the one given in [7] to allow for incomparabilities in the plausibility relation $<$ between possible worlds. Removal is carried out using the plausibility relation in combination with a second relation \prec which can be thought of as indicating “reasons” for holding one world to be more plausible than another. We axiomatically characterised this general family as well as certain subclasses, and we showed how this family includes some important and natural families of belief removal, specifically those which may be generated from prioritised default bases and the preferential counterpart of AGM contraction. Our results show the central construct used in this paper, i.e., semi-modular contexts, to be a very useful tool in the study of belief removal functions.

For future work we would like to locate further subclasses of interest, for example the counterparts in this setting of systematic withdrawal [19] and severe withdrawal [24]. We would also like to employ semi-modular contexts in the setting of *social belief removal* [8], in which there are several agents, each assumed to have their own removal function, and in which all agents must remove some belief to become consistent with each other. [8] showed that, under the assumption that each agent uses a removal function generated from a *modular* context, certain *equilibrium points* in the social removal process are guaranteed to exist. An interesting question would be whether these results generalise to

the *semi-modular* case. Since semi-modular contexts are built from strict partial orders, this question should also be of some relevance to the problem of *aggregating strict partial orders* [20, 21].

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